Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge by Bosomworth, Tracey Nicolau
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 4
1982
Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of
Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge
Tracey Nicolau Bosomworth
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bosomworth, Tracey Nicolau (1982) "Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 58 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol58/iss1/4
Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions
of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 expressed concern
with the status of state exemption provisions. 2 One policy consideration
behind the new Code was to provide a "fresh start" for debtors.3 Yet,
in many instances, state exemptions allowable in bankruptcy were
hopelessly outdated and served only to frustrate the possibility of this
fresh start.4 A contemporary exemption scheme was needed, and a last-
minute compromise between the House and Senate led to the enactment
of the present exemption provision, section 522.1 Section 522(b)(2) allows
a debtor to choose between exemptions set forth in state law and a federal
exemption package.' However, subsection (b)(1) potentially limits this
choice.' This provision grants debtors the above described election unless
the state enacts legislation which specifically denies its citizens access
to the federal exemptions." Such state action is known as "opting out"
of the federal exemption scheme. Section 522 represents a marked
departure from the exemption provision of the Code's predecessor, section
6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 9 Exemptions allowed to debtors under
1 11 U.S.C. SS 101-151326 (Supp. V 1981).
2 H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6087.
'Id. at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6078.
Id. at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6087.
11 U.S.C. S 522 (Supp. V 1981).
Id. S 522(b)(1). See infra note 8.
11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(1). See infra note 8.
Section 522(b) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may ex-
empt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the
State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsec-
tion specfically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsec-
tion (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date
of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has
been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other
place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before
the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or
joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or
joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. S 522(b) (emphasis added).
' Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, S 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. S 24 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
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the former Act's section 6 were primarily those prescribed by state law.0
Recent litigation suggests that this departure from the former
exemption scheme poses serious questions concerning the constitutionality
of section 522.11 This note first considers whether section 522(b) violates
the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution12
by providing for an election between state and federal exemptions and
by granting power to the states to opt out of the federal scheme. Second,
this note discusses whether the grant of power to the states to opt out
of the federal exemption scheme unlawfully delegates power to the states
in violation of the bankruptcy"3 and supremacy clauses of the Constitution."
This note examines the methods by which Congress may lawfully delegate,
and thus defer, to state law and considers whether those methods have
been used in section 522. It is argued that the grant of power in section
522(b)(1) is unlawful because it does not conform to any permissible method
of deferral to state law. Finally, this note suggests that by enacting section
522 Congress may have defined the minimum level of allowable
exemptions, and some state exemption provisions can thus be declared
unconstitutional because they conflict with federal law. However, this
analysis, while effectuating the Code's policy of providing a fresh start
for debtors, overlooks the issue of whether the opt-out power has been
unlawfully delegated to the states. Section 522(b)(1) remains vulnerable
to such a challenge.
,o Section 6 provided:
Exemptions of Bankrupts. This Title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or
by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State
wherein they have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in
any other State: Provided, however, That no such allowance shall be made
out of the property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed and which is
recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Title for the benefit
of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by way of
security only and the property recovered is in excess of the amount secured
thereby, such allowance may be made out of such excess.
Id.
See, e.g., Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (Bankr. 4th Cir. 1981); In re Rhodes,
14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Sullivan, 11 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981),
aff'd, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 972 (Bankr. 7th Cir. May 19, 1982); In re Ragsdale, No.
80-2335 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1981); In re Bloom, 5 Bankr. 451 (Bankr. ND. Ohio 1980).
"z U.S. CONST. art. I, S8, cl. 4 provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish
a uniform rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States ......
13 Id.
1 The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.




The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.""5 What the framers of the Constitution intended by "uniform"
has been revived as a potent issue in recent challenges to the
constitutionality of section 522.16 The Supreme Court has long interpreted
uniformity to mean geographical uniformity, as opposed to personal
uniformity," allowing bankruptcy law to have different effects on debtors
in the various states.18 Justification for the Court's interpretation, whether
this interpretation was intended by the framers, and what effects it should
have on section 522, are explored below.
The Intended Meaning of Uniformity
There is little commentary discussing the incorporation of the
bankruptcy clause into the Constitution,1 9 yet the meaning of the phrase
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" is crucial to an analysis
of whether section 522 meets the uniformity requirement. One authority
states that the grant of power to Congress to establish bankruptcy laws
resulted from "the importance of preserving harmony, promoting justice,
and securing equality of rights and remedies among the citizens of all
the States.."20 The framers seemed concerned with the injustice and
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
18 See, e.g., In re Lausch, 12 Bankr. 55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Sullivan, 11 Bankr.
432 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981), affid, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 972 (Bankr. 7th Cir. May
19, 1982); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. NJD. Ohio 1980); In re Bloom, 5 Bankr. 451
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
7 Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). See infra notes 28-30 and accompa-
nying text.
" 186 U.S. at 190. Geographic uniformity requires, in part, that the same law be in effect
throughout the United States, that the law have a "general operation" throughout the
states. Personal uniformity, referred to as "true uniformity" by one writer, see infra note
22, would require that the federal bankruptcy law not allow state-by-stats variations. See
infra text accompanying notes 19-51.
1 See generally P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974); 2 J. STORY. COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1102-1115 (1873); C. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1972); Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy
Clause, 1 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 215 (1957); Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1940).
J. STORY, supra note 19, § 1107.
It is obvious, that if the power is exclusively vested in the States, each one
will be at liberty to frame such a system of legislation upon the subject of
bankruptucy and insolvency as best suits its own local interests and pursuits
.... In short, diversities of almost infinite variety and object may be introduced
into the local system, which may work gross injustice and inequality, and
nourish feuds and discontents in neighboring States.
1982]
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inequality which would result from allowing the states to enact bankruptcy
laws which could operate differently in each state.21 The early bankruptcy
acts and the historical climate surrounding the drafting of the bankruptcy
clause suggest that the framers intended uniformity to mean that
bankruptcy laws may not be enacted if they have differing effects on the
citizens of the various states -a "true uniformity" was required.' Despite
this seeming intention, the uniformity requirement has not been construed
to compel a uniform effect on all debtors in every state.
The Hanover Analysis
In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 3 the forerunner of section 522'
was attacked as lacking constitutional uniformity. 5 The challenged provi-
sion, section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,26 specified that exemptions
allowable in bankruptcy were primarily those prescribed by state lawY
The effect of section 6 was to allow each state to retain its own exemp-
tion scheme resulting in state-to-state variations. Petitioner's theory rested
on the fact that creditors were treated differently in the various states.
Although such an effect had been present since the earliest forms of the
21 Id.
See Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of the Federal "Opt-Out"
Provision is Constitutional, 1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 65, 72-85. The writer describes the events
and debates surrounding the enactment of the bankruptcy clause, reviews the earliest
bankruptcy acts, and argues that the framers intended the uniformity requirement to mean
"true uniformity": federal law may not allow state-by-state variations.
2 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
- 11 U.S.C. S 522.
1 186 U.S. at 183. Some scholars have supported the reference to state laws in the ex-
emption provisions of the various bankruptcy acts with a strict construction of the bankruptcy
clause. Suggesting that the framers did not intend that there be one uniform national
bankruptcy law, Nadelmann writes: "[Ilt is no accident ... that the Bankruptcy Clause
speaks of 'uniform laws,' rather than one 'uniform law,' which Congress may pass on the
subject of bankruptices, thus leaving Congress a free hand in adopting, if it is so desired,
different laws for different types of debtors." Nadelman, supra note 19, at 227. Such an
analysis is inappropriate as a justification for reference to state law in the exemption pro-
visions. It is, however, appropriate to an issue hotly debated by the drafters of the Bank-
ruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841: what is the nature of bankruptices? It was in this context
that Nadelmann made the observation. Id. The debates discussed whether "bankruptices"
in the Constitution meant bankruptcy as defined in England, which was applicable only
to "traders," or whether it encompassed other forms of insolvency and could apply to banks
and other contracting parties. The plural of bankruptcy in the Constitution supports the
proposition that "bankruptcy," as intended by the framers, encompasses many forms of
insolvency. C. WARREN, supra note 19, at 6-8. For a review of the various attempts at defin-
ing the scope of "bankruptices," see Radin, supra note 19. Thus, an analysis of the use
of the plural in the phrase "uniform laws" aids in the delination of what "bankruptices"
encompass, not in an interpretation of the meaning of "uniform."
2 Ch. 541, S 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. S 24 (1976)).
1 See supra note 10.
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Act, this was its first uniformity challenge. The Court produced a two-
tiered analysis which may not have carried out the framers' intention
of true uniformity, but which did at least vindicate contractual expecta-
tions. Under Hanover, variations in bankruptcy law are permissible, so
long as there is both general uniformity and geographic uniformity.
The Court ruled that "uniformity is geographical and not personal,"'
and that "the provision of the Act of 1898 as to exemptions is [not] incom-
patible with the rule. ' According to the Court, the geographic uniformity
required by the Constitution permitted variations between the bankruptcy
provisions of several states. But the Court's analysis implicitly recognizes
a broader and more fundamental uniformity requirement, that of general
uniformity. The Court reasoned that the "general operation of the law
is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in dif-
ferent States."31 Section 6 had a uniform general operation over all the
states in that it deferred to state law in every instance. Geographic unifor-
mity under this analysis would not permit Congress to enact one set of
bankruptcy exemptions for the northern states and a different exemp-
tion package for the southern states. The Hanover Court's reasoning sup-
ports the inclusion of a general uniformity requirement into its definition
of geographic uniformity. The Court stated:
[O]ne of the effects of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution
issued in favor of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his
property subject to levy, and applying it to the payment of all his
debts according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper,
therefore, to confine its operation to such property as other legal pro-
cess could reach. A rule which operates to this effect throughout the
United States is uniform within the meaning of that term, as used in
the Constitution2
The "other legal process" to which the Court refers is the operation
of state law creditor remedies. The Court reasoned that the respective
rights of debtors and creditors at the time their obligation was contracted
were ascertainable by reference to state law; thus, section 6 effectuated
equitable policies.
I One scholar notes that although "the constitutionality of the Act (of 1841) had been
long and violently attacked, the Act was passed, achieved its purpose . . . and was re-
pealed, before any decision as to its constitutionality was made by the Supreme Court:'
C. WARREN, supra note 19, at 85. In no cases decided under the Act of 1841 did the Court
specifically consider the constitutional question. "That which was of doubtful constitutionality
in 1841 had become unquestioned law in 1867-and without any specific decision by the
Supreme Court." Id. at 87. Indeed, only recently has the Supreme Court ever found a
bankruptcy law in violation of the uniformity requirement of the Constitution. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
, 186 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
3Id.
21 Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
Id- at 189-90 (emphasis added).
19821
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This [use of state-promulgated exemptions] is not unjust, as every debt
is contracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under
existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably complain if
he gets his full share of all that the law, for the time being, places
at the disposal of creditors.-"
Because all creditors and debtors within a state contract with reference
to the same state laws, a federal law which provides for state-promulgated
exemptions has geographic uniformity within the various states despite
the differences between the states. 4 In other words, geographic uniform-
ity requires that similarly situated citizens within a state be treated alike.
All state citizens are subject to the same state laws; therefore a bankrupt-
cy law retaining state law treats similarly situated state citizens alike.
Since exemptions were determined by state law in every jurisdiction, sec-
tion 6 had a uniform operation throughout the United States despite the
state-to-state variations.
The two-tiered analysis set forth in Hanover to determine whether a
bankruptcy law is uniform as required by the Constitution asks the follow-
ing: (1) Whether the federal bankruptcy provision can be said to have
a general operation throughout the United States (general uniformity);
and if so, (2) Whether the effect of such general uniformity is to treat
all similarly situated debtors and creditors within a state alike in bank-
ruptcy (geographic uniformity).5
Section 6 and Section 522 Distinguished
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 18986 provided that allowable
bankruptcy exemptions were those prescribed by state law." Section 522
of the current Code' does not, however, merely defer to state law. Subsec-
tion (b)(2) allows a debtor to choose between state exemptions and a federal
exemption package. 9 Subsection (b)(1) permits a state to deny its citizens
this election, thereby binding its debtors to the state exemption package."0
Several nonuniform effects potentially result from this situation. First,
there may be dissimiliar treatment of debtors and creditors in various
states. Debtors in Washington, for example,- have access to the federal
' Id. at 189.
' The federal law meets the "general" uniformity requirement in that it has the same
general operation in all the states. See supra text accompanying note 31.
186 U.S. at 188. Cf. infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (effect of uniformity re-
quirement on delegation power).
u Ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. S 24 (1976)) (repealed
1979).
, For text of S 6, see supra note 10.
11 U.S.C. § 522.




exemptions,41 but debtors in Kentucky are bound to the state exemption
package.42 More significantly, there may be dissimiliar treatment of debt-
ors and creditors within a state. Debtor A in a non-opting state may choose
to utilize the state exemptions; debtor B in the same state may choose
the federal package. The remedies of creditors in each instance may vary
dramtically, 3 and this dissimiliar treatment underscores the significant
difference between the current section 522 and the former section 6: under
old section 6 all debtors within a state were bound by a state exemption
scheme; there was no potential for dissimiliar treatment of intrastate debt-
ors as there is now under section 522.
The Hanover Analysis: Application to Section 522
Courts which have recently sustained the constitutionality of section
522 in the face of uniformity challenges have failed to consider the dif-
ferences between section 522 and the former section 6, and the depth
of analysis provided by the Hanover Court. Rather, these courts inter-
pret Hanover to mean that any exemption provision which applies to all
states and defers in any way to state law is uniform under the Hanover
guidelines.44
Section 522 cannot withstand a proper uniformity analysis under the
two-tiered Hanover test. The current provision meets only the re-
quirements of the first part of the test. Section 522 can be said to have
general uniformity in that the provision applies throughout the United
States; that is, Congress has not adopted one exemption package for half
of the states and a different package for the remainder. Section 522 does
not, on the other hand, meet the second tier geographic uniformity re-
quirement which mandates that all similarly situated debtors and creditors
41 To date Washington has not opted out pursuant to S 522(b)(1).
42 Ky. REv. STAT. S 427.170 (Supp. 1982).
'1 The extent of the variation depends on the substantive differences between each state's
exemption provision and the federal package set forth in § 522(d). For articles comparing
the various state exemption schemes to the federal scheme, see Duncan, Through the Trap
Door Darkly: Nebraska Exemption Policy and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 60 NEB.
L. REV. 219 (1981) (discussing Nebraska's exemption scheme); Fisher, New Bankruptcy Ex-
emption Law: What it Means for Texans, 44 TEX. L.J. 145 (1981) (discussing Texas' exemp-
tion scheme]; Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes-The Need for Reform and a Proposed
Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127 (1980) (discussing Virginia's exemption scheme); Note,
H.B. 674: Ohio Opts Out of the Federal Bankruptcy Exemptions and Revises Its Exemption
Laws, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461 (1980) (discussing Ohio's exemption scheme).
" See, e.g., In re Lausch, 12 Bankr. 55, 56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1981); In re Sullivan, 11 Bankr.
432 (Bankr. C.D. II. 1981), affd, 6 COLLIER BANKR. GAS. 2d (MB) 972 (Bankr. 7th Cir. May
19, 1982). In Lausch, the court stated that historically Congress had left the duty pf deter-
mining exemptions to the states and that in § 522(b), "Congress has again delegated to
the states the task of determining bankruptcy exemptions." 12 Bankr. at 56. In Sullivan
the court briefly reviewed the Hanover decision and held § 522 to be constitutional under




within a state be treated alike under the bankruptcy law. 5 In non-opting-
out states,46 similarly situated debtors and creditors do not receive like
treatment in bankruptcy under section 522. If debtor A chooses the federal
exemption package and debtor B chooses the state package, both of the
debtors, as well as their creditors, receive different treatment in bank-
ruptcy. Section 6 state exemption provisions were sustained in Hanover
because the rights of the parties were ascertainable at the time of the
contract. 7 In non-opting-out states it is now more difficult for parties to
form a contract with predictable rights and remedies because at the time
the obligation is created a creditor will be unable to anticipate which ex-
emption scheme a citizen would choose should he go into bankruptcy. As
different protection may be provided under each package, 8 creditors will
be unable to protect themselves from the harsh impact of conflicting ex-
emption provisions. If the uniformity of section 522 is sustained, creditors
must contract not only with reference to state law, but also with reference
to potential debtor rights provided by federal law. 9 Furthermore, sus-
taining this sort of uniformity will continue to thWart the fresh start policy
underlying the Code.' States which opt out of the federal scheme can
maintain state exemption provisions which are less generous than those
provided for in section 522(d), thereby frustrating the possibility of a fresh
start for its bankrupt citizens.51
The Hanover Court justified its validation of section 6 on the ground
that the rights of debtors and creditors were ascertainable at the time
of the contract; that justification is not present under section 522. If in-
deed the framers of the Constitution intended a true uniformity of
bankruptcy laws, that intent has been frustrated by the Hanover Court's
allowance of state-to-state variations in exemption provisions. Constitu-
tionally required uniformity should not be completely abandoned by courts
which ignore the Hanover analysis and blindly apply its result.
, See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
,6 To date nineteen states and the District of Columbia allow their citizens an election
between the state and federal exemptions: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
" See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
48 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
," To determine whether it is feasible for a creditor to protect him or herself notwithstand-
ing the debtor's right to choose between exemption schemes requires a careful examina-
tion of the relation between the federal exemption package and exemptions provided by
state law. For articles comparing various state exemption schemes to the federal scheme,
see sources cited supra note 35.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemp-
tions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339,339 (1980). But see Comment,




UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE STATES
In 1819 the Supreme Court held that the power given to the United
States to pass bankruptcy laws is not exclusive. 52 States could discharge
debts among their own citizens provided Congress did not pre-empt the
field.' However, beyond this deceptively simple declaration many prob-
lems exist. When Congress has acted, thereby pre-empting state law to
some extent, it may still desire to delegate some matters to the states.
It has done so with the exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.1 Because the bankruptcy power is exclusive to the extent
exercised,' congressional attempts to defer to state legislation within an
otherwise comprehensive bankruptcy scheme must be closely examined.
The uniformity requirement, however it may be construed, demands some
degree of exclusivity;' and so uniformity must be taken into account when
considering delegation as well as when considering uniformity in and of
itself.
Generally speaking Congress has exclusive bankruptcy power and may
defer to state law in only three ways: (1) by applying the federal law
to an existing structure of state-created rights and obligations; (2) by ex-
plicitly incorporating the state law into federal law; or (3) by remaining
silent and allowing concurrent state power to act.' The question now ad-
dressed is whether Congress, through enactment of section 522(b)(1), has
deferred by permitting states to opt out-in a permissible manner-or
whether such a grant of authority to the states represents an unlawful
delegation of power in violation of the bankruptcy and supremacy clauses
of the Constitution. 9 Challenges to the constitutionality of section 522(b)(1)
on this ground have not been accepted by the courts.' In fact, the unlawful
" Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see also Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see generally P. COLEIAN,
supra note 19, at 31-36 (discussing the constitutionality of state insolvency laws). This power
to discharge is limited in that states may discharge contractual obligations incurred after
the enactment of the abrogating law, but are prohibited from applying that law retrospec-
tively to obligations incurred prior to the law's enactment. See Sturgis v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
11 U.S.C. §5 101-151326 (Supp. V 1981).
0 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-96 (1819).
" See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
11 That is to say, bankruptcy law cannot be both uniform and at the same time subject
to the legislation of multiple sovereigns. Thus, to the degree that bankruptcy must be
uniform, the power to legislate in that area must be exclusively federal. See generally Sturges
v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-96 (1819).
" In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 558, 560 (1891). Hertz, supra note 51, at 342.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 4; art. VI, cl. 2.
10 See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 6 COLLIER BANKR. GAS. 2d (MB) 972 (Bankr. 7th Cir. May 19,
1982), affig 11 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. CD. IlL 1981); In re Ragsdale, No. 80-2335 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. Apr. 9, 1981).
1982]
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delegation challenge has been typically dismissed with a mere citation
to the 1891 Supreme Court decision of In re Rahrer.6' These recent cases
have failed to correctly apply or even comprehend the Rahrer analysis."
The petitioner in Rahrer challenged an 1890 federal statute, pro-
mulgated under the commerce power, which provided that all liquor
transported into any state was to be subject to the laws of that state.3
In was argued that the statute resulted in an unlawful delegation to the
states of a power vested exclusively in Congress.64 The Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that the power was not exclusive. 5
The Rahrer analysis began with a discussion of the grant of the article
I powers to Congress. The Court noted that the proposition that "Con-
gress can neither delegate its own powers nor enlarge those of a State,"
is too obviously true to admit of argument.6 However, as to the chal-
lenged statute, the Court reasoned:
Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate com-
merce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or to grant
a power not possessed by the States, or to adopt state laws. It has
taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to these
subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose uniformity
is not affected by variations in state laws dealing with such property.
The principle upon which local option laws, so called, have been
sustained is, that while the legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law, it can make a law which leaves it to municipalities or
the people to determine some fact or state of things, upon which the ac-
tion of the law may depend .... 67
140 U.S. 545 (1891). This trend seems to have begun in 1902 when the Supreme Court,
in Hanover Nat'l. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), dismissed an unlawful delegation
challenge to 5 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in the same manner. The Court merely cited
Rahrer, stating: "Nor can we perceive in the recognition of the local law in the matter
of exemptions ... any attempt by Congress to unlawfully delegate its legislative power."
Id. at 190.
1 For the most part, recent decisions have ignored the analysis set forth in Rahrer.
See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text. The decision in In re Sullivan, 6 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. (MB) 972,980 (Bankr. 7th Cir. May 19, 1982), affg 11 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1981), on the delegation issue relied upon Hanover in which the court dismissed an unlawful
delegation challenge to S 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act with a mere citation to Rahrer.
The challenged statute provided:
That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported
into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale
or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject
to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same man-
ner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Ter-
ritory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein
in original packages or otherwise.
Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. S 121 (1976)). The functional
similarity of this statute to S 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act is worth noting. See infra note
68 and accompanying text.
140 U.S. at 550-54.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 560.
'7 Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added).
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The thrust of this analysis is to sustain the validity of a congressional
act which leaves to the states the determination of some fact or condition
upon which federal law may apply. Section 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act
allowed the states to specify the fact or condition of what property the
bankruptcy law could operate upon. Such delegation, allowing states to
declare what property was included in the debtor's estate, was clearly
constitutional in this sense. 8 Section 522 is not a constitutional delega-
tion of power under Rahrer, as will be shown below in a detailed analysis
of the three permissible methods of delegation.
Applying Federal Law to an Existing Structure of State-Created
Rights and Obligations
Section 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act deferred to state law by applying
federal law to an existing structure of state-created rights and
obligations. 9 Exempt property was excluded from the bankruptcy estate.7"
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction only to determine the merits of
the bankrupt's claim to exemptions; after this threshold determination,
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and control over the exempt property
ceased.7' Under the old Act, state law did not direct the use of federal
power, but rather identified the connection between the particular rights
or obligations created by the state and a given person.72
The 1978 Code provisions which define the parameters of the debtor's
estate are substantially different from the provisions of the old Act. The
debtor's estate now includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debt-
or in property as of the commencement of the case."73 Consequently, this
expanded definition gives the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all the
debtor's property, including any exempt property.74 This jurisdictional
expansion affects Congress' ability to delegate to the states the power
to enact bankruptcy exemption provisions.
The application of federal law to an existing structure of state-created
rights and obligations requires Congress to determine the relationship
between bankruptcy and state law remedies. 75 Section 522(b)(1) allows the
states to determine when federal bankruptcy law will apply (by not opting
out) or when non-bankruptcy state law will apply (by passing legislation
opting out of the federal scheme). Consequently, Congress no longer defers
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
"See supra note 8.
70 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
,1 W. LAUBE, W. HILL & L. KING, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 6.01 (2d ed. 1982).
'2 Specifically, § 6 merely deferred to property rights created by the states for its citizens.
These property rights were the connection between a debtor and exempt property.
73 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
7' 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1982).
75 Hertz, supra note 51, at 343.
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to state law by applying federal law to an existing structure of state-
created rights as it did under the old Act; instead Congress has delegated
the power to control federal law to the states."
Section 522, permits states to determine to which of the debtor's prop-
erty bankruptcy will apply only when the debtor elects the state exemp-
tions or the state opts out. By granting states the power to opt out, thus
guaranteeing the application of state law in every such instance, Con-
gress has not merely delegated the power to specify a fact or condition,
but to choose the substantive content of a bankruptcy law. Such delega-
tion is impermissible under Rahrer.
That states can now direct the relationship between the bankruptcy
law and property already within federal jurisdiction77 is further support
for this contention. The opt-out clause empowers the states to control
property within federal jurisdiction,7" whereas the challenged statute in
the Rahrer case "imparted no power to the state not then possessed,"
but allowed immediate local jurisdiction over imported property." In sum,
the opt-out provision impermissibly delegates power to the states by allow-
ing them to specify to what state-created rights federal bankruptcy law
will apply.
Incorporation of State Law as Federal Law
Section 522(b)(1) cannot be sustained under the theory that Congress
incorporated state opt-out legislation as its own law. The Rahrer court
stated that
Congress [cannot] transfer legislative powers to a State nor sanction
a state law in violation of the Constitution, and if it can adopt a state
law as its own, it must be one that it would be competent for it [Con-
gress] to enact itself and not a law passed in the exercise of the police
power."0
' Hertz briefly outlines this argument and concludes: "In sum, improper delegation of
power under subparagraph 522(b)(1) appears to be a serious question." Id. at 343-44.
' See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
78 11 U.S.C. S 541 (Supp. V 1981).
11 140 U.S. at 564. In addition, the Court noted that "[t]he framers of the Constitution
never intended that the legislative power of the nation should find itself incapable of disposing
of a subject matter specifically committed to its charge." Id. at 562. However, it cannot
be said that the congressional intent behind S 522(b)(1) was to dispose of bankruptcy ex-
emptions. By including all the property of the debtor in the bankruptcy estate and thus
conferring federal jurisdiction over such property, in addition to setting forth a detailed
exemption package, Congress intended to establish bankruptcy laws, not dispose of them.
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The Assimilative Crimes Act is an example of Congress
adopting state law as its own. The Act provides:
Whoever within or upon a federal enclave is guilty of any act or omission
which although not made punishable by Congress, would be punishable if com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of the state in which the enclave is located,
is guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
18 U.S.C. S 13 (1970). The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act in United
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When considering whether Congress may constitutionally incorporate
state opt-out legislation into the federal bankruptcy law, uniformity con-
siderations merge with delegation considerations. Congress cannot attempt
to adopt the state's opt-out legislation as bankruptcy law because to do
so would create different bankruptcy exemption schemes for different
states. There would be one package of "federal exemptions" for opting-
out states (derived from the state law) and a different "federal package"
for non-opting-out states (set forth in section 522). This result violates
the first tier of Hanover, the general uniformity requirement. 1 Thus, Con-
gress cannot adopt the states' opt-out legislation as a federal bankruptcy
law, because it cannot grant the states the power to do what it itself
does not have the power to do.
2
Deferral by Congressional Silence
Congress may also defer to the states by permitting a state to legislate
in an area where Congress is competent to legislate but has chosen not
to.' However, Congress has clearly acted with regard to exemptions
allowable in bankruptcy and thus the delegation of power found in sec-
tion 522(b)(1) cannot be sustained under this final permissible method of
deferral." Thus it is clear that the opt-out authority granted to the states
by section 522(b)(1) was not granted through a permissible means of delega-
tion and represents an unconstitutional delegation of power to the states.
Dodging the Delegation Issue: A Pre-emption
Analysis
Several recent decisions have considered the constitutionality of state
exemption provisions by analyzing the pre-emptive effect of section 522
on those state provisions." In an action to determine the amount of an
States v. Sharnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). The Court noted: "Rather than being a delegation
by Congress of its legislative authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing adoption
by Congress for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses and punishments as shall
have been already put in effect by the respective States for their own government." Id.
at 294.
81 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
" 140 U.S. at 560. As a practical matter, the opt-out provision results in a situation
in which Congress does not attempt to adopt state law, but rather allows the states to
decide whether or not to adopt federal law.
See sources cited supra note 58.
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 6-25 (U978) (discussing
ramifications on state regulations when Congress has validly decided to "occupy the field").
I Cases applying this pre-emption analysis include: Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d
60 (Bankr. 4th Cir. 1981); In re Balgermann, 16 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. N.D. InI. 1982); In re




allowable exemption, the debtor in Cheeseman v. Nachman8" proposed a
liberal construction of Virginia's homestead exemption. The court ruled
that a liberal construction was required because Congress had enacted
a specific exemption provision, and the Virginia law should not be inter-
preted to conflict with the more generous federal exemption provision.'
Support for this position was found in the policies underlying the enact-
ment of section 522, described in the legislative history: "In developing
the Act's exemption law, Congress observed that under prior law exemp-
tions had been determined by reference to state laws which had become
so outdated in many instances that they were 'hopelessly inadequate to
serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modern urban debtors.' ""
The Cheeseman court reasoned that the states "should [not] be left free
to classify which bankrupt debtors should be entitled to exemptions when
the classification conflicts with federal law."' 9 Although not specifically
addressing the question of whether the power granted by the opt-out pro-
vision was constitutionally delegated, the court held that Congress had
generally pre-empted state law with regard to exempt property interests
in bankrutpcy cases and thus the states could not enact laws which con-
flict with the federal exemption scheme. To avoid this pre-emption prob-
lem, the court gave the state law a narrow construction.
A Tennessee bankruptcy court subsequently adopted the Cheeseman
analysis in In re Rhodes.' In Rhodes, the debtor-plaintiff attacked the con-
stitutionality of Tennessee's opt-out legislation." The issue, according to
the court, was whether Tennessee's opt-out statute should be pre-empted
or given effect.9 2 The court rejected the defendant's argument that sec-
tion 522(b)(1) represented congressional recognition of the concurrent state
power to enact bankruptcy laws when not specifically pre-empted by
federal law. 3 The court found instead that "Congress clearly ha[d] pre-
empted state law with regard to the exemption of property interests in
bankruptcy cases ... .,9' According to the Rhodes court, the Cheeseman
case stands for the proposition
that Congress [in setting out a detailed federal exemption scheme]
has placed appropriate limitations in the opt-out authority granted
to the states.
16 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981). Cheeseman is discussed in Comment, In re Cheeseman:
A Judicial Revision of Virginia's Homestead Exemption Laws, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 391 (1982).
Id. at 63.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 126, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087).
Id. at 64.
14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
,' TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980).





*.. [T]he states may exercise that authority only if they provide
their citizens with a scheme of bankruptcy exemptions that is not in-
consistent with the provisions of § 522.15
Because the court could not find a way to construe the Tennessee exemp-
tion provisions such that the conflict with the federal scheme could be
avoided, it held that Tennessee had exceeded its authority under section
522(b)(1).9
Further support for the Cheeseman and Rhodes analyses is found in the
comments of a drafter of section 522:
Another objective of this Code was to enhance the benefits of
bankruptcy for consumer debtors-to make sure they get a fresh start.
One of the ways this has been accomplished is through the exemption
process....
One thing Congress couldn't agree on was a national exemption
statute.... Still, Congress did establish a federal floor which the
debtor can opt for as an alternative to the exemptions provided by
state law. The reason for the federal floor was an inability to agree
on a national exemption package which would be applicable in all
cases.
97
The commentary went on to state that the opt-out provision
came about as a result of compromise because it was felt that the
Congress was stepping on people too much, that the state should have
some say in this exemption business, as they have had in the past.
So each state was given the option of enacting a law that would remove
the applicability of the federal exemption package in bankruptcy cases
filed in that particular state. It was hoped that, in the process of do-
ing that, any state which did that would review its own exemption
laws and up-date those laws accordingly. 9
The "federal floor" is the minimum package of exemptions allowable in
bankruptcy by federal law. Thus, where a state opts out and provides
for less generous exemptions, that state law conflicts with the federal
standards.' In enacting a detailed federal exemption package, Congress
1 Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 634-35. The court permitted Tennessee debtors to continue to have the option
of exempting property pursuant to the federal scheme. Id. at 635.
17 Report of Seminar: Bankruptcy Law (New) 10-11 (held at the College of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky, Aug. 24-25, 1979).
98 Id. at 18. Because the final version of § 522 was a last-minute compromise
between the House and Senate, the constitutional considerations of that version were never
explored. Interview with Hon. Joe Lee, Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, in Lexington, Kentucky (Aug. 1981).
" As the Rhodes court noted, "Congress obviously did not intend, and, in any event,
was constitutionally prohibited from, delegating unfettered authority to the states to regulate
bankruptcy exemptions. To do so would enable the states to totally frustrate the fresh
start of many debtors:' 14 Bankr. at 633. To prevent the delegation of "unfettered authority,"
Congress may only delegate authority to the states if it defines the limits within which
the states can exercise that authority. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935). The analyses in Cheeseman and Rhodes are firmly rooted in bankruptcy and
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had defined the limits within which the states may act. As a result, state-
promulgated exemption provisions must be at least as favorable to the
debtor as those provided by Congress or they will be suspended.
CONCLUSION
Section 522 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act is unconstitutional
because it violates the uniformity requirement of the Constitution's
bankruptcy clause and unlawfully delegates power to the states. -
Section 522 cannot withstand a constitutional uniformity challenge under
the Hanover analysis which requires both "general uniformity" and
"geographic uniformity." Major differences between the previous exemp-
tion provision and section 522 have been either overlooked or ignored
by courts recently sustaining the uniformity of section 522. The alter-
native elections provided by section 522(b) yield varying degrees of relief
for debtors similarly situated across the United States, and for those debt-
ors domiciled in states which have not opted out, the relief varies within
the states. In states that have not opted out, contract rights are no longer
governed solely by state law. Creditors are unable to adequately protect
their interests unless reference is made to both state and federal exemp-
tion provisions because debtors retain the option of electing either set
of rights. In addition, the policy of providing a fresh start for debtors
which underlies the Code, continues to be thwarted by section 522.
Moreover, section 522 constitutes an unlawful delegation of power to
the states because it does not defer to the states by a permissible method.
Section 522 represents neither an adoption of state law nor congressional
silence, unlike section 6 of the 1898 Act which allowed the states to specify
upon what objects federal law may operate. The effect of section 522 is
to allow the states to control federal law-they are permitted to enact
bankruptcy laws regulating interests under federal jurisdiction in viola-
tion of the bankruptcy and supremacy clauses of the Constitution. Re-
cent lower court decisions, although not addressing the constitutionality
of Section 522(b)(1), employ an analysis which adequately effectuates the
Code's policy of providing a fresh start for debtors. State laws which pro-
vide for less generous exemptions than those set forth in section 522 are
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has stated,
The Federal Constitution, Article I, S 8, gives Congress the power to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. In
view of this grant of authority to the Congress it has been settled from an
early date that state laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of
Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankrupt-
cies are suspended. While this is true, state laws are thus suspended only
to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy
Act of Congress.
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918).
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deemed in conflict with federal law, and thus unconstitutional. Although
this effectuates the fresh start policy of the Code, the courts must ad-
dress the primary issue: whether the opt-out power granted to the states
by section 522(b)(1) represents an unlawful delegation of power to the
states.
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